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Abstract 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY:  
 
This master's thesis examines among the hedge funds managed by a sole manager, whether 
differences in perfomance and risk between ones managed by female (female funds) and ones 
managed by male managers (male funds) exists. For simplicity, in this study such differences are 
refered as the ”gender effects” of hedge fund managers. I also explore whether the gender effect on 
perfomance can be explained by the gender effect on risk. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY: 
  
The primary data is extracted from the Academic Lipper TASS database. The sample use in this 
study includes 5697 live hedge funds  that began operation in the period January 1994 to 
December 2013. The excluded funds are the ones that was borned outside that period of time or 
the ones that have ceased functioning. Manually collected data regarding managers’ gender is used 
to complement the primary data.  Other data including Fung-Hsieh factors and three month T-bill 
rate and are retrieved on David A. Hsieh’s data library website and DataStream database.   
 
Hedge funds managed by a sole female manager are matched with similar hedge funds managed 
by a sole male manager using Propensity Score Matching method. The variables used for matching 
are  the size of the funds, management fee, incentive fee, leverage usage, and managers’ capital 
investment. The gender effects on perfomance and risk are calculated as the average differences 
between the paired funds in Fung-Hsieh 8-factor risk adjusted return and net volatility. 
 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY: 
 
There is a weak evidence that female funds overperform equivalent male funds by 0.17 percent 
monthly return over the period January 1994 to December 2013. However, during the two 
financial crises 1997 and 2008, female funds net excess return of about 0.16 and 0.31 monthly 
respectively compared to male funds, significant at 1 percent level. Volatility is not found to be 
significantly different for male and female funds. The gender effect on  returns is not adequately 
exlplained by the gender effect on volatility, accounting for about 4 percent of the variance. I 
propose several explainations for the gender effect on perfomance based on the existing literature.  
 
Keywords  gender, hedge fund, manager, risk, performance, return, volatility  
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1. Introduction 
In early 2014, consulting firm Rothstein Kass (now KPGM) had reported that hedge funds run 
by women had outperformed ones managed by men, two years in a row. From January 1, 
2013 through the end of November 2013, those female led hedge funds provide an average of 
9.8 percent returns compared to the 6.13 percent returns on the HFRX Global Hedge Fund 
index. Several articles suggesting the superior of women in the hedge fund industry had then 
circulated the media, including popular websites such as International Business Time, New 
York Times, and Reuters 1. The main suggested reason for the alleged superior performance 
of female led funds is that women tend to be more risk-averse than men, and such risk-
aversion net them better return in the turbulent market after the 2008 crisis. However, there 
are contradictory ideas that the over-performance is not due to managers’ gender but to 
unrelated factors such as the size effect, as women tends to manager smaller funds 2. Inspired 
by those opinions from the media, this paper focuses on identifying potential gender 
differences in hedge fund industry with regards to fund performance and riskiness. In this 
paper, I will refer to such differences stemmed from the managers’ gender as “gender effect”. 
Further extrapolating those ideas, I also explore whether the gender effect on performance can 
be explained by the gender effect on risk, based on the reasoning that the higher risk-aversion 
of female manager might be reflected in their funds’ lower risk level.   
The differences between men and women in making decision and how those differences affect 
organizations’ behaviour have been popular topics in academic literature. A rich body of 
psychological research has pointed out that women likely take less risk than men do in a 
variety of situations (Byrnes, Miller and Schafer, 1999). Another feature in female mentality 
is a lower level of overconfidence compared to man (Barber and Odean, 2001; Bengtsson et 
al., 2005; Huang and Kisgen, 2013). The higher risk aversion and less overconfidence may 
influence how women make financial decisions. One of first study supports the notion of 
gender difference in financial decision making is an article by Lewellen, Lease, and 
Schlarbaum (1977) that identifies gender as one of the most important determinants of 
investors’ investment strategy.  
1  www.ibtimes.co.uk/women-hedge-fund-managers-made-more-money-men-2013-1432348 
    www.dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/want-better-hedge-fund-returns-try-one-led-by-a-woman/ 
   www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/15/hedgefunds-women-idUSL2N0KO1XR20140115 
2   www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/01/economist-explains-20 
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From then, there has been an abundance of literature supports the gender effect in decision-
making (see Bruce and Johnson, 1994; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Hudgens and Fatkin, 1985; 
Johnson and Powell, 1994; Sunden and Surette, 1998; Booth and Nolen, 2012.) 
Understandably, gender has been used as a proxy for risk aversion and overconfidence in 
organizations leaders, including boards of directors, CEOs, and mutual funds managers to 
assess whether their personal characteristics affect their firms, producing mixed results. 
Martin et al. (2009), Elsaid et al. (2011), and Faccio et al. (2014) find lower levels of several 
risk measurements in companies with female CEOs. Atkinson et al. (2003) and Ruenzi et al. 
(2014) study female mutual funds managers to find no difference in fund performance and 
risk in female managed funds compared to the male. Gender as a proxy for overconfidence is 
used by Levi et al. (2014) to find out that less overconfident female directors tend to less 
overestimate merger gains, which results in fewer bids in M&A deals. 
More recently, there has been studies suggest men to be more prone to sensation seeking and 
competitive behaviours (Levi et al., 2010; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2008). Such behaviours 
have potentials to affect firms and funds managed by men. However, there are not as many 
studies focusing on dominance and sensation seeking as compared to risk aversion and 
overconfidence.  
Details analysis of existing literature will be presented in the literature review section. 
With all the studies on corporations and mutual funds, it is a curiosity to see no peer-reviewed 
paper dedicated to the effects of manager gender on hedge fund performance and risk yet. 
Therefore, this thesis is an attempt to bridge such gap. The result will give insight into 
whether there are differences in female and male managed hedge fund performance and risk 
as well as their relationship. On a broader scope, my thesis contributes to the ongoing 
research on how leaders’ personal characteristics may affect their organizations. Finally, I am 
also exploring the use of propensity score matching (PSM) method in financial research. PSM 
is extremely popular in the field of biomedical, but its use in economics and finance has been 
relatively limited. In suitable situation, PSM could be very useful in saving time and resources 
while providing meaningful results. 
This study is conducted on 79 hedge funds with a sole female manager (referred as “female 
fund”) among nearly 6000 currently active hedge funds from TASS database during the 
period from January 1994 to June 2014. Each female fund is matched with a hedge fund with 
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a sole male manager (referred as “male fund”) using PSM method. Risk-adjusted returns 
from Fung-Hsieh 8-factor extension model (Fung and Hsieh, 2004) and net return volatility 
are calculated for each fund as measurements for fund performance and risk. From these data, 
the gender effect can be analysed using the average differences in risk-adjusted returns and 
volatility between female fund-male fund pairs. 
Based on the claim of superior performance of female managed hedge fund from media 
reports, my first hypothesis is that female funds would have higher risk-adjusted return 
compared to male funds. My result shows weak support for the hypothesis in the whole 
period, suggesting female funds on average earn 0.17 percent more than male funds in 
monthly risk-adjusted return only at 10 percent confidence level. However, during two 
financial distress periods January 1997 – December 1998 and January 2007 – December 
2009, there is strong support that female fund earns 0.16 percent and 0.31 percent more in 
monthly risk-adjusted return respectively. 
On the notion that female managers may be more risk averse, my second hypothesis is that 
female funds have less net return volatility than male funds, reasoning that such risk aversion 
of the manager might transfer into funds’ operation. The result does not support this 
hypothesis.  In the whole sample period as well as the subperiod January 2007 – December 
2009, the average difference in volatility between female funds and male funds is not found to 
be significantly different from zero. Only during the financial crisis 2008, female funds have 
lower volatility than male funds. My proposed explanations for this finding are (1) female 
hedge fund managers are not inherently more risk averse than males; (2) even if the female 
managers are more risk averse, they may still choose the investment with the same riskiness 
as the men do; and (3) the net return volatility, as a risk measurement, does not reflect the 
lower risk that female managers might have taken.  
My final hypothesis is that the differences in risk-adjusted return can be explained by the 
differences in volatility. Over the sample period, the explain power of volatility differences is 
very poor, accounting for about 4 percent of total variance of risk-adjusted return differences. 
From the findings, I conclude that there should be other explanations for the superior 
performance of female funds other than the volatility argument. I propose four possible 
explanations based on the existing literature. 
(1) There are different characteristics associating with female managers other than the 
gender-specific risk aversion that also affect fund performance. 
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(2) Male managers may make more value-destroying trades, especially during the periods 
of financial turbulence.  
(3) There is a potential glass ceiling in the hedge fund industry that forces female 
managers to be better than their peers to attain a same position, thus the females have 
better capacity to create superior performance. 
(4) Female managed funds may face additional survivor risks. There may be lower capital 
inflows into female managed hedge funds compared to similar-performing male 
managed ones. Less capital inflow may lead to higher probability of non-superior 
female managed funds to cease operation.  
Limitations of the study include the use of the sub-optimal PSM for time series data, the lack 
of data and the usage of only one measurement for performance (risk-adjusted returns) and 
risk (volatility). The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section II reviews the existing 
literature. Section III restates the hypotheses. Section IV introduces the data. Section V 
presents about the methodology. Section VI shows the results. Section VII discusses the 
possible explanations for the gender effect on fund return and volatility and limitations. 
Section VIII concludes. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Differences between men and women on a psychological level 
The focus of gender study relevant to this paper has been on the topics of risk aversion, 
overconfidence, sensation seeking and competitiveness.  
There is a widespread consensus in academic literature that women are generally more risk-
averse than men are. The meta-analysis of 150 studies by Byrnes, Miller and Schafer (1999) 
concludes that male participants are more likely to take risks than female participants in a 
variety of situation, including making financial decisions. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) 
find out that single female hold less risky asset than sing male. Powell and Ansic (1997) 
conduct an experiment to show that females are less prone to risk-seeking than males 
irrespective of familiarity and framing, costs or ambiguity. However, Schubert, Brown, 
Gysler and Brachinger (2000) suggest that context, framing, and ambiguity matter with 
respect to gender differences in risk attitude as under controlled environment, gender-specific 
risk behaviours may not arise. Another experiment by Meier-Pesti and Goetze (2006) 
suggests that femininity affect financial risk-taking positively, while masculinity has the 
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reverse effect. Regarding allocating assets in retirement savings account, women also exhibit 
a larger risk aversion (Bajtelsmit, Bernasek and Jianakoplos, 1999). Furthermore, when 
making decision to invest in mutual funds, women exhibit less risk-taking than men in their 
most recent, largest, and riskiest mutual fund investment decisions (Dwyer, Gilkeson and List, 
2002). On the other hand, Nelson (2014) argues that the evidence for the claim “women are 
more risk averse than men” is much weaker than has been portrayed. 
There are evidences that men are more susceptible to overconfidence then women. 
Overconfidence is a cognitive bias in which a person's subjective confidence in his or her 
judgments is reliably greater than the objective accuracy of those judgments (Pallier et al. 
2002). Overconfidence is extremely common in both men and women, with DeBondt and 
Thaler (1995) argue “Perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that 
people are overconfident”. Barber and Odean (2001) state that in areas such as finance men 
are more overconfident than women, leading to two predictions: men will trade more than 
women will, and the performance of men will be hurt more by risk-adjusted live trading. 
Bengtsson, Persson and Willenhag (2005) use a large set of exam data from Stockholm 
University to find that male students are more inclined than female students to aim for higher 
grades. Striving for higher grades could be due to overconfidence in male students, or their 
more competitive nature. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) demonstrate in their experiment that 
men are more overconfident. On the other side of the argument, Johansson-Stenman and 
Nordblom (2010) find no support for the popular hypothesis that men are more overconfident 
than women based on their field experiment. 
Sensation seeking is “a trait defined by the seeking of varied, novel, complex, and intense 
sensations and experiences, and the willingness to take physical, social, legal, and financial 
risks for the sake of such experience.” (Zuckerman, 1994). The meta-analysis by Brown, 
Cross, and Cyrenne (2013) using Zuckerman's Sensation Seeking Scale supports the view that 
men and women differ in their propensity to report sensation-seeking characteristics. Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2009) present arguments supporting men are more prone to sensation seeking 
behaviour. Men are more attracted to risky sport activities, violence, alcohol and drug abuse, 
and gambling. Investors with sensation seeking tendency trade more frequently. 
Men could be found to be more competitive than women in several studies. Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) find out men have a preference for performing in a competition based on 
their observation that 73 percent of the men in their experiment choose to participate in a 
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competitive tournament incentive scheme, while only 35 percent of the women do so. In a 
different experiment, Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval (2005) show similar result when men, 
given the choice between a tournament and a piece-rate pay scheme before performing a real 
task, choose the tournament option significantly more often than women.. 
An interesting manifestation of men’s lower risk aversion, higher confidence, sensation 
seeking and competitiveness is that they tend to make more stock market trades than women. 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) support that men trade more than women within all age 
groups, potentially linking to increased male sensation seeking tendency. Barber and Odean 
also document a 45 percent increase in trading frequency made by men compared to women, 
reducing men’s net return by 2.65 percentage points a year as opposed to 1.72 percentage 
points for women. 
2.2 Differences between men and women on an organizational level 
Gender study on an organizational level has been mainly on leaders of corporations and 
mutual funds. The manifestations of gender effect on organizations are not always in line with 
male and female personal cognitive traits.  
Study has attempted to find the gender effect on companies based on CEOs’ gender (Martin et 
al. 2009, Elsaid et al., 2011, Faccio et al., 2014). All three studies on CEOs’ gender suggest 
that female CEOs tend to reduce measurements associated with risk. Martin et al. propose that 
firms with relatively high risk are more likely to appoint females CEOs so that risk might 
decrease. However, the abnormal returns associating with appointing a female CEO is not 
significantly different from a male.  
Female members in boards of directors seem to affect companies differently from males. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that chief executive officer turnover is more sensitive to stock 
performance and directors receive more equity-based compensation in firms with more 
gender-diverse board. In 2003, a new law was introduced requiring that 40 percent of 
Norwegian firms’ directors be women, at the time only 9 percent were women. Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012) find that the women quota in Norwegian firms’ board led to higher leverage 
and more acquisitions, and deterioration in operating performance. Admittedly, the effect 
could be due to younger and less experienced boards that firms have to hastily assemble, 
rather than the effect of an increase in number of female board member. 
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In merger and acquisition, Levi et al. (2014) find out that less overconfident female directors 
tend to less overestimate merger gains, which results in fewer bids. 
With regards to mutual funds, Atkinson et al. (2003) find that male- and female-managed 
funds do not differ significantly in terms of performance, risk, and other fund characteristics. 
Ruenzi et al. (2014) also suggest no difference in mutual fund performance. However, both 
papers document significantly lower capital inflows into female-managed mutual funds than 
into male managed funds. On the other hand, Welch and Wang (2013) find some evidence 
that the percentage of female managers managing a fund is negatively related to the fund’s 
performance over time. In addition, female managers have more conservative investment 
strategies; tend to hold a higher total number of assets (stocks) and fewer assets in their top 10 
holdings than do male managers. 
An interesting common point about the mentioned papers in companies and mutual funds is 
the perception of the market toward female leaders. Despite find no difference in risk and 
performance measurements of female and male managed mutual fund, Atkinson and Ruenzi 
both find significant lower capital flows into female managed funds, about one third lower 
than male managed funds. Martin (2009) also supports the view that the market perceives 
female CEOs to be relatively more risk averse. Lee et al. (2007) report that investor reactions 
to the announcements of female CEOs are significantly more negative than those of their male 
counterparts. While the market perception in case of female CEOs could be reasonably 
supported if decreasing firm risk measurements is undesirable for shareholders, the disparity 
between female managed mutual funds characteristics and their capital flows could be a sign 
of disservice to them. 
2.3 Individual and group thinking  
There are evidences that working in a group will significantly alter the decision making 
process of each individual. Cooper and Kagel (2005) shows that teams consistently play 
more strategically than individuals play and generate positive synergies in more difficult 
games. Another research on mutual funds suggests that extreme opinions of single manager 
in a team average out and, consequently, teams make less extreme decisions than individuals 
do (Bär, Kempf, and Ruenzi, 2010). Teams are also found to follow less extreme investment 
styles and their portfolios are less industry concentrated than those of single managers are. 
Teams are eventually less likely to achieve extreme performance outcomes. Based on those 
examples, it is reasonable to suspect that hedge funds managers will also change their 
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behaviour when working in a group. Therefore, to avoid the bias caused by the team effect 
and exemplify the gender effect, this paper only considers hedge funds with a sole manager.  
2.4 Hedge funds and mutual funds 
As many studies quoted earlier are based on mutual funds, it should be noted that while 
mutual funds and hedge funds are both investment vehicles, there is a main critical difference 
between them. Hedge funds, unlike mutual funds, are not regulated by SEC and not required 
to disclose their asset holdings. Therefore, hedge fund managers enjoy much greater 
flexibility in choosing their investment strategies, enabling them to pursuit very high risk-
high return or experimental and exotic investment styles. Liang (1999) found that hedge 
funds follow dynamic trading strategies, have low systematic risks, and there are low 
correlations between strategies. However, hedge funds cannot be advertised to the public and 
their investors are required to be accredited; i.e. they must have a minimum net worth. As a 
result, normal investors who can participate in mutual funds usually cannot invest in hedge 
funds directly.  
 
Hedge funds also differ from mutual funds in their pursuit of alpha return. Therefore, hedge 
funds usually have a management fee structure designed to motivate managers to seek alpha 
(Liang, 1999). This is the case when managers’ stock picking skill maters the most. 
Therefore, I expect differences in fund performance due to managers’ skill would be more 
noticeable in hedge funds. 
2.5 Glass ceiling against women  
The term “glass ceiling” is to describe organizations' failure to promote women into top 
leadership roles (Eagly and Carli, 2007). There has been evidence of such barrier in the 
corporate ladder against women. Lyness and Thompson (1997) find out executive women 
having less authority, receiving fewer stock options, and having less international mobility 
than men. Women at the highest executive levels reported more obstacles than lower level 
women. Barreto et al. (2009) assess that women are underrepresented in the upper echelons 
of organizations. Part of the problem seems to stem from the perception of women as leaders, 
for example, female managers are often stereotyped as either competent or warm - but not 
both.  
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With the large influx of women into the professional world over the last two decades, it is 
possible that the glass ceiling has weakened or disappeared, if it had existed in the first place. 
However, given the fact that the hedge fund industry is still dominated by male managers, 
evidenced by the overwhelming number of male managed fund, I consider the glass ceiling a 
potential problem for female managers.    
3. Hypothesis 
There are three hypotheses that will be explored in this paper. 
Hypothesis 1: female funds have higher risk-adjusted return compared to male funds 
Hypothesis 2: female funds have less net return volatility than male funds 
Hypothesis 3: The differences in risk-adjusted return between female funds and male funds 
can be explained by their differences in volatility 
4. Data 
4.1 Data source 
The hedge fund data is gathered from the Academic Lipper TASS database. The database is 
the largest hedge fund database in the world, documenting more than 6000 live funds from 
1990 to June 2014 together with around 7000 graveyard fund. Funds that are active as of 2014 
are live funds. Those have stopped reporting to TASS before that are moved to the graveyard 
section. Due to the lack of manager information for graveyard funds, only live funds are 
included in the study. Furthermore, to match the hedge fund data with the data available on 
Fung-Hsieh factors, only funds that began operation in the period January 1994 to December 
2013 are included in this research. Fund that started in 2014 are excluded because they have 
too few observations. In total, 5697 hedge funds are included in my sample. 
The commercial version of TASS database contains name and contact for fund manager. 
However, the academic version lacks any manager information. Therefore, managers’ gender 
is checked from funds’ websites, LinkedIn and online resources. Any funds that managers 
cannot be reliably identified will be dropped out of the sample.  
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Other data including Fung-Hsieh factors and three month T-bill rate and are retrieved on 
David A. Hsieh’s data library website 1 and DataStream database.   
4.2 Survival bias 
Because gathering manager data for dead funds is near impossible, this study only includes 
active funds as of June 2014. Therefore, survival bias should be expected. Survival bias 
means that weak performing funds eventually have to close down, possibly leading to 
overestimating the hedge fund average return. However, any systematic survival risks that 
affect both male and female managed funds are expected to be even out when comparing 
female funds and male funds. I suggest there could be a possible additional survival risk 
specifically for female managed funds that could explain the thesis results. Detail analysis is 
presented in section VII. 
5. Methodology 
5.1 Overview 
To answer the research question, propensity score matching (PSM) will be used to estimate 
the gender effect on measurements of hedge fund performance and risks. The research process 
is conducted in three steps: 
1. Identify the female funds. 
2. Use PSM to find a matched male fund for each female fund 
3. Calculate Fung-Hsieh risk adjusted returns and volatility for each female fund-
male fund pair and estimate the gender effect. The gender effect is then tested for 
statistical significance using paired-sample t-test. 
The use of PSM instead of more simple and direct multivariate linear regression is motivated 
by the fact that the database is large (around 6000 funds in 10 years), and requires large 
amount of additional hand-collecting data not feasible within the resource and time 
constraints of this research. As the hedge fund database lacks any information regarding 
managers, such information must be obtained from funds’ websites. For reliable linear 
regression analysis, all funds in the sample must be looked up and classified accordingly to 
manager characteristics. Random sub-sampling would risk omitting female hedge funds, 
which are already quite rare.  
1  https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm 
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On the other hand, with PSM, only the data on female funds and their matching male funds 
must be verified. Isolating all female from males is not as crucial as with regression analysis, 
as all the pairs can be quickly checked after matching so that any erroneous pairs can be fixed 
and PSM can be rerun until appropriate matching is achieved. As long as the initial process of 
identifying female fund is randomized enough, it should be equivalent to random sampling.  
Data processing is done in Stata and Microsoft Excel. More details of each step in the 
research process will be discussed next. 
5.2 Identifying hedge funds with a single female manager 
Female fund is defined as a fund with only one top manager who is female. Consultants, 
analysts, and administration staffs are not taken into account. The gender of the current top 
manager is confirmed via the fund’s website based on available pictures and the biography 
published on the pronoun used (“she”/”her”). No effort is made to distinguish whether the 
gender is biological or self-identified. After that, the time she has been leading the fund is 
determined based on fund’s website. In total, 79 female funds whose managers remain the 
same throughout the sample are identified. They are not all female funds that could exist in 
the sample, due the limited time for hand collecting data. The rest of the funds are classified 
as unidentified funds. In addition, 3857 funds are verified to have one or several male 
managers. 
5.3 Propensity score matching (PSM) 
PSM is a statistical matching technique that can match and compare individuals in two groups 
in pair. It can deal with multiple matching criteria by constructing a propensity score for each 
individual in each group based on chosen matching variables, and then match them based on 
the score alone. Originally, PSM is extensively used in the biomedical field to evaluate the 
effect of treatments on patients. PSM then has seen sparse usage as a statistical analysis tool 
to estimate causal effect in finance and economics. Dehejia and Wahba (1999) use PSM to 
study labour market policies, while Hitt and Frei (2002) research the influence of online 
banking on customer profitably. PSM applies for all situations where one has a treatment, a 
group of treated individuals and a group of untreated individuals (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2005). In my study, PSM is adapted to analyse the effect of manager gender on hedge fund 
activity. The ‘treatment’ can be thought as ‘being female’, ‘female manager hedge funds’ as 
the ‘group of treated individuals’, and ‘male manager hedge funds’ as the untreated group. 
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Idealistically, our thesis question could be best answered by finding out what happens with 
the fund when a manager gender is swapped, with all other variables being the same. PSM 
can be a reasonable estimate for such unrealistic experiment. The following section presents 
step-by-step to conduct PSM, mostly based on the guidance from Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
(2005). 
The PSM method used in this thesis is an adaptation of Caliendo and Kopeinig’s method, with 
a combination of clustering and nearest-neighbor matching. First, I identify the variables 
crucial to hedge fund performance. Two variables are used in separating funds into clusters:  
inception year and investment strategy. Five other variables are used to calculate propensity 
score: fund size at inception, management fee, incentive fee, whether the fund used leverage, 
and whether the fund managers have personal capital in the fund. Only funds within the same 
cluster will be matched with each other, based on the propensity score. 
Each fund is classified into an inception-strategy cluster so that all the funds in a same cluster 
have the same inception year and follow the same investment strategy. Inception year and 
investment strategy can be thought as hard constrains that require perfect matching. 
Investment strategy is one of the largest factors in hedge fund performance; with about 20 
percent of the cross sectional variable in performance is explained by differences in 
investment style (Brown and Goetzmann, 2001). With regard to inception date, comparing 
funds with the same birth year allows the exclusion of time-varying effects and focus on 
cross-sectional differences between female funds and male funds. Furthermore, matching with 
cluster also eliminates the need to control for fund age, which could be a potential factors 
influencing performance (see Golec (1996), Carhart (1997), Howell (2011)). 
Table 1 exhibits the number of fund in each inception-strategy cluster. Panel 1A shows the 
number of female fund across all clusters, and panel 1B shows the aggregate data for all 
available funds. Female funds are found in 10 investment styles: Convertible arbitrage, 
emerging markets, equity market neutral, event driven, fixed income arbitrage, fund of funds, 
global macro, long/short equity hedge, managed futures and multi-strategy. The largest 
number of funds is in fund of funds, multi-strategy and long/short equity hedge with 26, 13 
and 11 funds respectively. There have been female funds beginning operation throughout the 
period 1994-2013, with larger number from 2002 onward. This trend is in line with the 
general trend that more hedge funds are birthed each year since 2002.  
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Table 1: Number of hedge funds in each inception year – investment strategy cluster 
This table shows the number of hedge funds in each inception year – investment strategy cluster. All funds in the same cluster have the same inception year 
and investment strategy. Panel A shows the number of female funds. Panel B shows the total number of hedge funds in the sample. 
Panel A: Female funds 
Inception
Year 
Investment strategy 
  
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
Emerging 
Markets 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
Event 
Driven 
Fixed 
Income 
Arbitrage 
Fund of 
Funds 
Global 
Macro 
Long/Short 
Equity 
Hedge 
Managed 
Futures 
Multi-
Strategy 
Other Total 
1994 -  -  1 -  -  1 -  -  -  -  -  2 
1995 -  -  -  -    1 -  -  1 -  -  2 
1996 -  1 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1 
1997 -  1 -  -  -  -  -  -  1 1 -  3 
1998 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1 -  1 
1999 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1 1 -  -  2 
2000 -  -  -  -  -  1 -  1 -  -  -  2 
2001 -  -  -  -  1 -  -  -  -  -  -  1 
2002 -  -  -  -  -  2 -  -  -  1 -  3 
2003 -  1 -  1 -  -  -  -  1 1 -  4 
2004 -  -  -  -  -  3 -  -  1 -  -  4 
2005 -  -  -  -  -  3 1 -  -  -  -  4 
2006 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1 2 1 -  4 
2007 -  1 1 1 -  2 -  1 -  2 -  8 
2008 -  -  -  -  -  4 -  2 -  -  -  6 
2009 -  -  1 -  1 3 2 -  -  -  -  7 
2010 -  -  -  -  1 1 1 -  -  3 -  6 
2011 1 -  -  1 -  2 -  3 -  2 -  9 
2012 -  -  -  -  -  2 1 -  -  -  -  3 
2013 -  -  -  -  -  3 -  2 1 1 -  7 
Total 1 3 2 3 3 26 5 11 7 13   79 
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Panel B: All hedge funds  
Inception 
Year 
Investment strategy 
  
Convertible 
Arbitrage 
Emerging 
Markets 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
Event 
Driven 
Fixed 
Income 
Arbitrage 
Fund of 
Funds 
Global 
Macro 
Long/Short 
Equity 
Hedge 
Managed 
Futures 
Multi-
Strategy 
Other Total 
1994 1 4 3 - 1 18 - 14 3 - - 44 
1995 2 2 0 1 - 14 - 7 4 1 - 31 
1996 - 5 2 6 2 18 2 9 10 6 1 61 
1997 1 3 2 1 1 24 2 11 6 3 4 58 
1998 2 4 - 6 1 23 5 12 10 5 1 69 
1999 2 4 3 3 3 38 3 26 11 12 5 110 
2000 2 5 1 6 2 41 3 28 5 4 1 98 
2001 3 9 3 7 9 84 3 37 8 14 7 184 
2002 1 7 5 4 5 92 5 49 11 20 7 206 
2003 3 16 1 12 4 139 5 54 17 29 8 288 
2004 6 21 7 5 4 158 9 76 23 52 12 373 
2005 1 25 14 9 8 159 13 93 22 44 11 399 
2006 2 21 12 15 9 181 18 75 20 67 4 424 
2007 - 32 18 17 5 166 17 104 17 153 20 549 
2008 1 20 13 9 13 143 12 68 17 182 28 506 
2009 4 39 12 12 14 222 68 76 49 113 40 649 
2010 15 18 11 16 17 124 35 65 22 170 38 531 
2011 23 23 6 16 11 111 36 80 24 99 30 495 
2012 13 11 2 5 6 94 22 59 20 88 53 373 
2013 3 13 12 9 8 81 18 55 26 35 25 285 
Total 85 282 127 159 123 1931 276 999 326 1094 295 5697 
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On the next step, a propensity score is estimated for each hedge fund. The score is estimated as the 
conditional predicted probability from the following probit model. The propensity score can be 
simply interpreted as the probability of the fund belongs to the female fund group given the fund 
characteristics. 
 
Pr(𝐷 = 1|𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑀_𝑓𝑒𝑒, 𝐼_𝑓𝑒𝑒, 𝐿𝑒𝑣_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦, 𝑃𝐶_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 )
=  Φ (β1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  β2𝑀_𝑓𝑒𝑒 + β3𝐼_𝑓𝑒𝑒 + β4𝐿𝑒𝑣_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + β5𝑃𝐶_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 ) 
(1) 
D = 1 when the fund is a female fund, 0 otherwise 
Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution 
Size: Asset under management of the fund at its inception 
M_fee: managment fee 
I_fee: incentive fee 
Lev_dummy = 1 if the fund use leverage, 0 otherwise 
P𝐶_dummy = 1 if principals have money invested, 0 otherwise 
Presented is a probit model with the a dummy variable representing the ‘treatment’ (female fund) 
and ‘non-treatment’ (male fund) as the dependent variable, and a groups of independent variables of 
our choosing. The independent variables should be the one that may influence the chance that a 
manager is in the ‘female group’ and fund performance or risk. Based on that insight, the size, 
management fee, incentive fee, leverage usage, and managers’ capital investment are chosen. I 
present the reasoning for choosing those variables in the following paragraph. 
1. Fund size  
Ammann and Moerth (2005) reveals  empirical  evidence  for  a  positive  relationship  
between  fund  sizes  and  returns. He also finds that very small hedge funds tend to 
underperform on average. Potential explanation is that the larger the fund, the lower its 
expense ratio. The size is estimated as the first reported net asset under management in 
million USD after the fund’s inception. 
2. Management fee 
There is little direct link between management fee and hedge fund performance. 
However, I reason that for the same performance and incentive fee, investors would 
prefer funds with lower management fee. Therefore, funds may have to offer additional 
return to justify their management fee. The average management fee is on average 
18 
 
 
 
around only 1 percent annually compared to 20 percent in incentive fee, so it may not be 
a crucial factor. 
3. Incentive fee 
The incentive fee represents the largest cut manager can take from hedge fund returns, 
averaging 20 percent of profits (Liang, 2001). Intuitively, higher incentive fee would 
better motivate managers to generate more profits. Ackermann et al. (1999) shows that 
incentive fees explain some of the higher performance of hedge funds over mutual 
funds. On the other hand, Agarwal et al. (2009) argue that the incentive fee percentage 
rate by itself does not explain performance. However, other proxies for managerial 
incentives including the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of 
managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive 
contracts, are associated with superior performance.  
4. Leverage usage 
Leverage could increase the volatility of hedge fund returns (Liang, 1999), and could be 
an important factor in fund performance. However TASS only has the average leverage 
ratio for the whole period 1994-2014. As the leverage level can change with time, a 
more consistent proxy is whether the funds use leverage at all. Therefore, a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if leverage is used and 0 otherwise is chosen.  
5. Manager’s capital 
Similar to higher incentive fee, investing one’s own money in the funds may create more 
incentive for managers to pursuit high return. Moreover, manager’s capital in the funds 
could be an assurance for investors, which in turn may positive affect fund performance. 
The dummy variable takes the value of 1 if there is manager’s capital invested, and 0 
otherwise. 
Table 2 shows that statistics for the five mentioned variables. In panel 2A are the statistics for the 
female fund group. In panel 2B, the statistics for the whole sample is shown. Table 3 shows the 
coefficients, their stand deviation and t-value for the probit model (1). Only the coefficient for the 
size variable is statistically significant. 
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Table 2: Summery statistics of matching variables 
This table shows the summary statistics for Size (hedge fund size at its inception – calculated as total asset 
under management on the earliest reporting date, in million USD), Management fee (in percent), Incentive 
fee (in percent), leverage dummy (=1 if the fund use leverage, =0 otherwise), and the personal capital 
dummy (=1 if managers have money invested in the fund, = 0 otherwise). Panel A shows the statistics for 
female funds, panel B shows the statistics for all hedge funds. 
Panel A: female funds 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: All hedge funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Mean Std Min Max 
Size 21.51 47.25 0.12 166.15 
Management fee 0.98 1.29 0 4 
Incentive fee 20.19 18.57 5 20 
Leverage dummy 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Personal capital  0.33 0.47 0 1 
  Mean Std Min Max 
Size 58.15 121.05 0.08 248.65 
Management fee 1.29 0.62 0 6 
Incentive fee 20.19 7.23 0 50 
Leverage dummy 0.49 0.5 0 1 
Personal capital  0.13 0.32 0 1 
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Table 3: The probit model for PSM, matching male and female funds 
This table shows the results of the estimation for the probit model   
Pr(𝐷 = 1|𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑀_𝑓𝑒𝑒, 𝐼_𝑓𝑒𝑒, 𝐿𝑒𝑣_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦, 𝑃𝐶_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 )
=  Φ (β1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  β2𝑀_𝑓𝑒𝑒 + β3𝐼_𝑓𝑒𝑒 + β4𝐿𝑒𝑣_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + β5𝑃𝐶_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 ) 
The dependent variable is the dummy variable which takes value of 1 if the fund is a female fund, 0 
otherwise. The independent variables are Size (hedge fund size at its inception – calculated as total asset 
under management on the earliest reporting date, in million USD), M_fee (Management fee in percent), 
I_fee (Incentive fee in percent), Lev_dummy (leverage dummy, =1 if the fund use leverage, = 0 otherwise), 
and PC_dummy (personal capital dummy, =1 if managers have money invested in the fund, = 0 otherwise). 
***: the coefficient is significant at 1% level 
**: the coefficient is significant at 5% level 
*: the coefficient is significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next step is to estimate the propensity score for each fund. It is the conditional predicted 
probability from probit model (1). Next, a match is found for each female fund. There are several 
matching algorithm, for example nearest neighbour matching, Caliper and Radius matching, and 
kernel matching. I will use the most straight forward algorithm, nearest neighbour matching. 
Nearest neighbour matching can be done with or without replacement. I choose the algorithm 
without replacement, which means each fund can only be in a single match. For each female fund, 
the unidentified fund in the same inception-strategy cluster with the closest propensity score to it is 
chosen as a match candidate. The chosen unidentified fund will then be checked; if it is a legitimate 
“male fund” then the match is confirmed. If not, the match is discarded; the unidentified fund is 
 coeffcient std t  
_cons 0.268 0.098 2.736  *** 
Size 0.536 0.126 4.274  *** 
Management fee -0.001 0.001 -1.265  
Incentive fee 0.019 0.013 1.468  
Leverage dummy 0.437 0.293 1.489  
Personal capital  0.255 0.325 0.782  
Pseudo R_squared 0.254 
n 5697 
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either removed from the sample or moved to the female fund group. This step is then repeated until 
every female fund is matched with a unique male fund. The matching quality will be verified after 
all pairs are matched. 
To increase matching quality, 8 worst-matched female fund-male fund pairs, meaning ones highest 
propensity score differences, are excluded, representing 10 percent of the sample. Table 4 shows 
that propensity score before and after truncating 8 worst-matched pairs. Panel 4A presents the 
average score for female fund and male fund group. The average score for female fund goes down 
from 0.74 to 0.67, while the average score for male fund goes up from 0.52 to 0.54 after truncating. 
Panel 4B tests for the mean difference between two groups. While the difference in score between 
female fund and female fund group is not statistically significant both before and after truncating, 
the average difference has been reduced by 0.09 to 0.13 in the latter case. Table 5 verifies that all 
matching characteristics are not significantly different between female fund-male fund pairs, up to 
10 percent significance level.   
There is a concern is that female managed funds left in the unidentified group will negatively affect 
the probit regression used to estimate propensity scores because they would be incorrectly classified 
(D=0). I address this issue by performing robustness check by rerunning the matching procedure 
with the fund group confirmed to have only one or many male managers. The matching will 
confirmed to be robust. Therefore, I consider the matching to be satisfactory. 
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Table 4: Propensity score 
This table shows the average propensity score before and after omitting 8 female fund-male fund pairs with 
largest difference in score. Panel A shows the average score of female fund and male fund separately. Panel 
B shows the average difference in score between female fund-male fund pairs. 
Panel A: The average propensity score of female funds and male funds before and after truncating 
  Before(n = 79) After (n =71) 
  Female Male Female Male 
Average 0.74 0.52 0.67 0.54 
Std 0.28 0.41 0.25 0.38 
 
Panel B: The average propensity score difference between female fund-male fund pairs before and 
after truncating 
  Before (n = 79) After (n=71) 
Average 0.22 0.13 
Std 0.24 0.25 
z 0.78 0.61 
p value 0.44 0.54 
 
 
 
Table 5: Summary statistics of the matching variables in female fund-male fund pairs 
This table show the statistics for the matching variable after the PSM procedure and the test for differences 
in means of those variables.  
  
  female fund male fund p value 
  Mean Std Mean Std   
Size 21.51 47.25 29.92 58.75 0.27 
Management 
fee 
0.98 1.29 0.97 1.62 0.17 
Incentive fee 20.19 18.57 21.47 14.45 0.31 
Leverage 
dummy 
0.81 0.39 0.90 0.28 0.26 
Personal 
dummy 
0.33 0.47 0.32 0.36 0.30 
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5.4 Measurements for hedge fund performance and risk 
I choose the risk adjusted return, or alpha, from Fung-Hsieh extended 8 factor model as the 
measurement for hedge fund performance. Total return volatility is used as the measurement for 
fund risk. 
While the more or less standard measurement for mutual fund performance is the excess returns 
from a variety of CAPM variations, measuring hedge fund performance is particularly troublesome 
because of its dynamic hedging and diverse strategies. Common models to estimate the hedge fund 
risk-adjusted return, hence the information ratio, include Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model; 
Agarwal and Naik (2004) option-based model; and Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008) 7-
factor model. In this study, I use an extension of Fung-Hsieh 7 factor model with the addition of an 
eighth factor, the emerging market risk factor, as suggested by Hsieh on his data library website. 
The emerging market risk factor is especially relevant for funds specialized on emerging markets, 
which presenting in our sample. Table 6 shows the summary statistics for all eight factors used in 
Fung-Hsieh model. 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝑆&𝑃𝑠 +  𝛽2𝑆𝐶𝐿𝐶 +  𝛽310𝑌 +  𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟 +  𝛽51𝐵𝐷𝑂𝑝𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐹𝑋𝑂𝑝𝑡
+  𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑂𝑝𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐸𝑚𝑒                                                                              (2) 
Two equity-oriented risk factors: the excess return of the S&P500 index over the 3-month T-bill 
rate (S&P); and a small-minus-big cap factor (SCLC) constructed as the difference between the 
Russell 2000 index monthly return and S&P 500 month total return. 
Two bond-oriented risk factors: the yield spread the monthly change in the 10-year treasury 
constant maturity yield over 3-month T-bill (10Y), and the change in the credit spread of Moody's 
BAA bond over the 10-year Treasury bond (CredSpr) 
Three trend-following risk factors: the excess returns on portfolio of lookback straddle options on 
currency (FXOpt), commodities (ComOpt) and bonds (BDOpt).  
Emerging market risk factor: the excess return of the MSCI Emerging Market index monthly total 
return over the 3-month T-bill rate (Eme). 
Data for the risk factors are retrieved from Hsieh's Data Library. 
As similar to how alpha is calculated in Fung et al. (2008) and Li et al. (2011), the alpha is 
estimated from model (2) using data from a rolling window of the most recent 24 month period. 
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Based on Li et al., the alpha estimation is repeated at the beginning of each quarter as opposed to 
each year in Fung et al. to obtain higher fidelity. Table 7 shows the summary statistic of each 
coefficient in regression model (2) over the whole period 1994-2014 for female funds and their 
matched male funds. The average month alpha for female funds is 0.56%, while the male funds 
have an average monthly alpha of 0.41%. Fung-Hsieh model is able to explain up to a maximum 
71% of female fund return variation and averaging at 55%. In case of male funds, up to 76% of 
return variation is explained, averaging 64%. I consider the explanatory power of the model 
adequate for this research.  
The preferable risk measurement is total return volatility, since it has the advantage of being model-
free and certain hedge fund investors do care about absolute performance (Li, Zhang, and Zhao, 
2011). Total return volatility is calculated quarterly based on monthly return in a 24-month period 
rolling window to match how the alpha is calculated. Since the regression is repeated every quarter, 
the risk-adjusted returns alpha and volatility are allowed to be time-varying. This allows me to 
analyse the variation over time of the gender effect on alpha and volatility. 
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Table 6: Summary statistics for Fung-Hsieh factors 
This table shows the summary statistics for the independent variables in the regression model (2) 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆&𝑃𝑠 +  𝛽2𝑆𝐶𝐿𝐶 +  𝛽310𝑌 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟 +  𝛽51𝐵𝐷𝑂𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑋𝑂𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑂𝑝𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐸𝑚𝑒                                                                               
S&P: the monthly excess return of the S&P500 index over the 3-month T-bill 
SCL: difference between the Russell 2000 index monthly return and S&P 500 month total return 
10Y: the yield spread the monthly change in the 10-year treasury constant maturity yield over 3-month T-bill 
CredSpr: the change in the credit spread of Moody's BAA bond over the 10-year Treasury bond 
BDOpt: lookback straddle options on bonds 
FXOpt: lookback straddle options on commodities 
FXOpt: lookback straddle options on currency 
Eme: the excess return of the MSCI Emerging Market index monthly total return over the 3-month T-bill 
rate 
All measurements are in percent, per month. 
The variables are retrieved from https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm 
  Mean  STD Min Max  
S&P 0.57 4.31 -16.94 10.72 
SC-LC 0.09 3.64 -16.38 18.41 
10Y 0.37 2.21 -7.87 9.53 
Cred Spr 0.26 2.12 -14.25 8.13 
BD Opt -1.66 15.23 -25.63 68.86 
FX Opt -0.35 19.21 -30.13 90.27 
Com Opt -0.24 14.18 -24.65 64.75 
Eme 0.61 7.04 -29.45 17.56 
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Table 7: Summary statistics for Fung-Hsieh factor loadings 
This table shows the summary statistics for the factor loadings in the regression model (2), across all female 
funds and male fund for the whole period 1994-2014. 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆&𝑃𝑠 +  𝛽2𝑆𝐶𝐿𝐶 +  𝛽310𝑌 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟 +  𝛽51𝐵𝐷𝑂𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑋𝑂𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑂𝑝𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐸𝑚𝑒                                                                               
S&P: the monthly excess return of the S&P500 index over the 3-month T-bill 
SCL: difference between the Russell 2000 index monthly return and S&P 500 month total return 
10Y: the yield spread the monthly change in the 10-year treasury constant maturity yield over 3-month T-bill 
CredSpr: the change in the credit spread of Moody's BAA bond over the 10-year Treasury bond 
BDOpt: lookback straddle options on bonds excess return over the 3-month T-bill 
FXOpt: lookback straddle options on commodities excess return over the 3-month T-bill 
FXOpt: lookback straddle options on currency excess return over the 3-month T-bill 
Eme: the excess return of the MSCI Emerging Market index monthly total return over the 3-month T-bill 
rate 
All measurements are in percent, per month. 
  female funds male funds 
  Mean  STD Min Max Mean  STD Min Max 
alpha 0.56 3.47 -2.12 3.39 0.41 2.74 -3.26 3.87 
S&P 0.08 1.45 -2.77 1.32 0.06 1.72 -3.21 1.69 
SC-LC 0.35 0.80 -0.92 0.55 0.25 0.59 -0.61 0.71 
10Y -0.07 0.79 -0.33 0.27 0.01 0.75 -0.32 0.27 
Cred Spr 0.23 1.23 -1.38 0.80 0.25 0.54 -1.18 0.99 
BD Opt 0.04 0.77 -0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.15 -0.33 0.18 
FX Opt 0.003 0.07 -0.07 0.09 -0.04 0.06 -0.07 0.09 
Com Opt 0.01 0.60 -0.29 0.07 0.05 0.69 -0.19 0.09 
Eme 0.02 0.19 -0.35 0.06 0.02 0.66 -0.62 0.26 
    
  
    
  
  
R_squared 0.55 0.28 0.18 0.71 0.64 0.47 0.09 0.76 
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6. Result 
In each quarter, the average gender effect of the manger being female on hedge fund performance 
and risk is estimated as the average difference of monthly alpha and monthly volatility difference 
between all female fund-male fund pairs.  
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎,𝑡 =  𝐸(𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡) 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 (𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎) 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 
𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑖 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 
𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑖 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 
 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝜎,𝑡 =  𝐸(𝜎𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜎𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡) 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝜎,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 
𝜎𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑖 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 
𝜎𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑖 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 
Figure 1 illustrates the time-varying average differences in alpha, while figure 2 shows the average 
difference on volatility. As can be seen from the graph, the gender effect of female manager on 
monthly risk-adjusted return is on an increasing trend. There seems to be two major periods that the 
gender effect on alpha is positive: from 1998 to 2005, and from 2007 to 2014. Meanwhile, the trend 
line of gender effect on volatility is nearly flat. The gender effect on volatility seems to be positive 
during the period 2000 to 2008, and negative during the rest. 
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Figure 1: The gender effect of female manager on risk adjusted return 
This graph shows the time-varying gender effect of female manager on risk adjusted return (alpha) over the 
period Jan 1994-Jun 2014. The first data is calculated on Jan 1996. The gender effect on alpha is calculated 
each quarter, based on the return of the latest 24 months. The gender effect is displayed as monthly return. 
 
 
Figure 2: The gender effect of female manager on net return volatility 
This graph shows the time-varying gender effect of female manager on net return volatility over the period 
Jan 1994-Jun 2014. The first data on volatility is calculated on Jan 1996. The gender effect on alpha is 
calculated each quarter, based on the return of the latest 24 months. The gender effect is displayed as 
monthly volatility. 
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The two first hypotheses can be tested with the gender effect of female manager and its standard 
deviation using t-test. The first hypothesis will be rejected if the gender effect of female manager 
for alpha is not significantly greater than zero. The second hypothesis will be rejected if the gender 
effect of female manager on volatility is not significantly smaller than zero. Estimate the standard 
deviation of gender effect of female manager to use in the paired-sample t-test is not straight 
forward because previous estimation steps have added variation beyond the normal sampling 
variation (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1998). Two main methods can be used to estimate the 
standard error, either by bootstrapping, or as the squared root of the variance approximation by 
Lechner (2001). I choose to use Lechner model instead of bootstrapping to avoid repeating 
verifying unidentified fund when resampling. In this case, because matching without replacement is 
used, Lechner’s variance coincides with the usual variance formula, which simplifies the 
calculation greatly. 
Table 8 shows the gender effect of female manager on alpha and volatility, its standard deviation 
and the result of two-tail paired-sample t-test for zero mean difference. Panel 8A, 8B, 8C shows the 
results for the whole period Jan 1994-Jun 2014, the subperiod Jan 1997-Dec 1998 and the subperiod 
Jan 2007- Dec 2009 respectively. The two subperiods are chosen to cover two major financial 
distress periods in the last two decades: the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the Global financial 
crisis of 2007-2008. 
The gender effect of female manager on alpha is found to be 0.17 percent monthly over the Jan 
1994-Jun 2014 period, significant at 10 percent level. I consider this result to be a weak support for 
the hypothesis that funds with female managers earn superior return compared to those with male 
managers. However, during two financial distress period Jan 1997-Dec 1998 and Jan 2007- Dec 
2009, the gender effect of female manager on alpha is 0.16 percent and 0.31 percent, both 
significant at 1 percent level. Therefore, I support the notion that female managers earn a significant 
positive return over their male counterparts at least during the time of financial turbulence. 
The gender effect of female manager on monthly net return volatility is not found to be significantly 
different from zero during the whole period 1994-2014 and the subperiod 2007-2009. During the 
subperiod 1997-1998, gender effect of female manager on monthly volatility is negative 3.5 
percent, significant at 1 percent level. As the difference is only found to be significant in one 
distress period, the result is insufficient to conclude that the net return volatility of female managed 
funds to be different from those of similar male managed funds.  
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To test whether the differences in volatility can explain the differences in risk-adjusted return, I run 
a simple regression model in which the gender effect of female manager on volatility is the 
independent variable, and the gender effect of female manager on alpha is the dependent variable 
for the whole period 1994-2014.   
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎,𝑡 = 𝑎 +  𝛽 ∗ 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝜎,𝑡 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎,𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹 𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛  𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝜎,𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹 𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 
Table 9 show the results of the above regression model. The coefficient for 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝜎,𝑡 is not 
statistically significant even at 10 percent level. More importantly, the model only explains about 4 
percent of the variation in the gender effect of female manager on alpha. Therefore, I conclude that 
the difference in volatility cannot explain a significant portion of the difference in risk adjusted 
returns.  
To test for robustness and address the concern that female managed funds left in the unidentified 
group will negatively affect the matching procedures, I re-estimate the probit model (1) and repeat 
the PSM process but using the funds from the verified one-or-several male manager group as the 
potential match for female fund, instead of the unidentified group. Table 10 show the result of the 
probit model estimated with the verified group. The coefficient is not every different from first 
estimation. After a similar matching process, only 6 out of 71 female fund-male fund pairs change 
compared to the original matching. Tablet 11 shows the gender effect of female manager on alpha 
and volatility. The results are in agreement with the previous one: gender effect of female manager 
on alpha is positive and significant at 10 percent level throughout the period and at 5 percent level 
during the two financial crisis periods. The gender effect of female manager on volatility is not 
statistically significant on any tested periods. Therefore, the first results obtained are considered 
robust with regards to the matching procedure.   
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Table 8: The gender effect of female manager on risk-adjusted returns and volatility 
This table show the gender effect of female manager on risk-adjusted returns and volatility for the 
whole period 1994-2014 and two subperiods 1997-1998 and 2007-2009. Panel A shows the gender 
effect of female manager for the period 1994-2014. Panel B shows the gender effect of female 
manager for the period 1997-1998. Panel C shows the gender effect of female manager for the 
period ´2007-2009. All measurements are in percent per month. 
***: the coefficient is significant at 1% level 
**: the coefficient is significant at 5% level 
*: the coefficient is significant at 10% level 
Panel A: gender effect of female manager for the period Jan 1994- June 2014 
 
Average std Min Max t p value 
risk adjusted 
return 
0.174 0.103 -0.092 0.421 1.689 0.092 * 
Volatility -0.781 2.715 -5.578 3.967 -0.288 0.774 
N (months) 246 
     
 
Panel A: gender effect of female manager for the period Jan 1997- Dec 1998 
  Average  std  Min  Max  t p value 
risk adjusted 
return 
0.163 0.045 0.101 0.227 3.622 0.000 *** 
Volatility -3.505 0.857 -5.204 -2.787 -4.091 0.000 *** 
n (months) 24 
     
 
Panel A: gender effect of female manager for the period Jan 2007- Dec 2009 
  Average  std  Min  Max  t p value 
risk adjusted 
return 
0.315 0.064 0.220 0.421 4.922 0.000 *** 
Volatility -1.98 2.734 -5.373 2.283 -0.438 0.664 
n (months) 36 
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Table 9: The regression of gender effect of female manager on alpha vs gender effect of 
female manager on volatility 
This table show the result of the regression model (3) 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎,𝑡 = 𝑎 +  𝛽 ∗ 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝜎,𝑡 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎,𝑡 is the gender effect of female manager on monthly risk adjusted return  over period t 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐹𝜎,𝑡 is the gender effect of female manager on monthly volatility  over period t 
***: the coefficient is significant at 1% level 
**: the coefficient is significant at 5% level 
*: the coefficient is significant at 10% level 
 
  cof. std t p 
_cons 0.17 0.01 13.78 0.00 *** 
dif in vol -0.01 0.00 -1.23 0.22 
R_squared 0.041 
   
Adj. R 
squared 
0.028 
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Table 10: The probit model for PSM, matching female and pre-verified male funds 
This table shows the results of the estimation for the probit model   
Pr(𝐷 = 1|𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝑀_𝑓𝑒𝑒, 𝐼_𝑓𝑒𝑒, 𝐿𝑒𝑣_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦, 𝑃𝐶_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 )
=  Φ (β1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  β2𝑀_𝑓𝑒𝑒 + β3𝐼_𝑓𝑒𝑒 + β4𝐿𝑒𝑣_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + β5𝑃𝐶_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 ) 
The dependent variable is the dummy variable which takes value of 1 if the fund is a female fund, 0 if it is a 
MF. The independent variables are Size (hedge fund size at its inception – calculated as total asset under 
management on the earliest reporting date, in million USD), M_fee (Management fee in percent), I_fee 
(Incentive fee in percent), Lev_dummy (leverage dummy, =1 if the fund use leverage, =0 otherwise), and 
PC_dummy (personal capital dummy, =1 if managers have money invested in the fund, = 0 otherwise). 
***: the coefficient is significant at 1% level 
**: the coefficient is significant at 5% level 
*: the coefficient is significant at 10% level 
 
  coeffcient std t 
_cons 0.36 0.12 2.93 *** 
Size 0.57 0.10 5.59 *** 
Management fee 0.00 0.00 -0.29 
Incentive fee 0.03 0.02 1.17 
Average dummy 0.33 0.25 1.32 
Personal dummy 0.13 0.39 0.32 
 
Pseudo R_squared 0.376 
n 3936 
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Table 11: The gender effect of female manager on risk-adjusted returns and volatility, 
matching female and pre-verified male funds 
This table show the gender effect of female manager on risk-adjusted returns and volatility for the whole 
period 1994-2014 and two subperiods 1997-1998 and 2007-2009. Panel A shows the gender effect of female 
manager for the period 1994-2014. Panel B shows the gender effect of female manager for the period 1997-
1998. Panel C shows the gender effect of female manager for the period ´2007-2009. All measurements are 
in percent per month. 
***: the coefficient is significant at 1% level 
**: the coefficient is significant at 5% level 
*: the coefficient is significant at 10% level 
Panel A: gender effect of female manager for the period Jan 1994- June 2014 
 
Average  std  Min  Max  t p value 
risk adjusted return 0.184 0.110 -0.092 0.421 1.679 0.094* 
Volatility -0.660 1.905 -5.578 3.967 -0.346 0.729 
n (months) 246 
     
 
Panel A: gender effect of female manager for the period Jan 1997- Dec 1998 
  Average  std  Min  Max  t p value 
risk adjusted return 0.142 0.032 0.101 0.257 4.364 0.000*** 
Volatility -3.240 0.732 -5.104 -2.387 -4.429 0.000*** 
n (months) 24 
     
 
Panel A: gender effect of female manager for the period Jan 2007- Dec 2009 
  Average  std  Min  Max  t p value 
risk adjusted return 0.351 0.114 0.200 0.421 3.079 0.004*** 
Volatility -1.366 2.405 -5.273 2.183 -0.568 0.574 
n (months) 36 
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7. Discussion 
In section VI, the evidences suggest there is a positive increase in risk adjusted return associating 
with female manager, especially during the financial crises. On the other hand, the gender effect on 
volatility remains inclusive. The gender effect on volatility cannot explain the variation in the 
gender effect on risk adjusted return. In this chapter, I will offer explanations on those results as 
well as consider the limitation of this study. 
7.1 Why female funds offer positive returns over male funds? 
Even though the evidence for positive gender effect of female manager on risk adjusted return is 
weak for the whole sample period, for the specific periods of financial turbulence 1997-1998 and 
2007-2009, the result is highly significant. Based on the literature reviewed, four plausible 
explanations are offered to explain this positive superior performance. 
Firstly, female managers in my sample may have characteristics that are not inherent to their 
gender, but may explain their fund returns. Li et al. (2009) shows that managers from higher-SAT 
undergraduate institutes tend to have higher risk-adjusted return. They also mention some weaker 
evidence that more established managers, who have more number of working years, tend to have 
lower returns. The female managers may happen to have graduate from higher SAT colleges than 
their peers, or have less working year. Those characteristics are not inherent to their gender, but 
nevertheless can influence their fund performance. More concrete evidence for this argument can be 
obtained if after including SAT score of managers and their working year as matching criteria, the 
gender effect of female manager on alpha decreases. 
Secondly, male managers may have the tendency to make more value-destroying trades. Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2009), and Barber and Odean (2001) have pointed out that men trade significantly 
more than women. If male managers trade more than female managers and achieve the same total 
return, their net return would be lower due to trading fees. This tendency to trade more may amplify 
during the financial crises and negatively affect male managed hedge funds even more. More risk-
seeking would encourage male managers to invest more compared to females during the high 
volatility period. Managers with overconfident issue may overestimate their ability to beat the odd 
and make a profit even in the time of crisis. Excessive competitiveness may push managers to prove 
themselves among their peers by trading against the odd. A weaker argument can be made for the 
sensation seeking tendency as well when managers derive personal joy from high-risk trading, but I 
find it difficult to justify how professional fund managers would hurt their investors’ asset to satisfy 
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personal pleasure. A counter point could be made against the argument that male managers may 
trade more. Professional, highly trained hedge fund managers should have enough knowledge to 
actively avoid those mentioned mental pitfalls. However, it should be noted that even highly 
sophisticated investors can fall victims to behavioural bias (see Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) – 
deposition effect, Kaustia et al. (2008) – anchoring effect). If this effect is true, then the superior 
performance of female funds would reduce after controlling for number of trade, or trading volume. 
Thirdly, there could be a glass ceiling in the hedge fund industry, forcing female managers to be 
better than their peers to attain the position of fund manager. There is no study on the glass ceiling 
in hedge fund industry yet, though mixed evidences are available in other business. If this ceiling 
exists, a woman would have fewer chances of becoming a manager than a man of similar skill level. 
Therefore, female managers who have made it to the top of the hedge fund hierarchy may on 
average have better investment skills and knowledge than their male peers. In an environment 
where individual skills are highly value like the hedge fund industry, those female managers may 
have a good chance to capitalize on their knowledge to produce better return. Similar results are not 
observed in the mutual fund industry potentially because either the glass ceiling in mutual fund 
industry is non-existent, or insufficient to force a skill gap between two genders. It is also possible 
that managers have more difficulty to capitalize on their investment skills due to legal constraints 
around mutual funds. Anecdote evidences of increasing female present in the hedge fund industry 
and the attention they are receiving make me believe that the glass ceiling could be thinning, if it 
has existed in the first place. Therefore, support for this argument could be made if the gender effect 
of female manager on alpha decrease in the future, or after controlling for a measurement of such 
glass ceiling.  
Finally, female managed funds may face additional survivor risks. , Atkinson and Ruenzi both find 
significant lower capital flows into female managed funds compared to similar male managed ones. 
Getmansky (2012) documented that increasing fund returns and flows reduces liquidation 
probability in hedge fund. Fung et al (2008) also suggest additional capital inflows attenuate the 
ability of alpha-producing hedge funds to continue delivering alpha in the future. If the same 
dynamic relationship between capital flow – returns – liquidation probability is assumed for both 
female funds and male fund, lower capital flow for female funds may require them to have superior 
returns just to have the same chance of survival as male funds. In short, unfair capital inflows may 
lead to higher probability of non-superior female managed funds to cease operation. The positive 
gender effect of female manager could be considered an artifact of the survivorship bias against 
female funds. More positive gender effect of female manager during the crises could be due to 
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surviving funds compensate for a possible increase in survivorship bias during such time. To test 
for this argument, defunct funds should be included in research sample, or the research model 
should control for capital flows. 
7.2 Why female funds do not have lower volatility than male funds? 
I offer three possible explanations why the volatility is not found to be significantly different 
between female funds and male fund. 
First, female hedge fund managers may not be inherently more risk averse than males, even if the 
average female investors are. Some specific personal characteristics may be advantageous to 
achieve the manager position, which may result in female managers have the same level of risk 
aversion as males. The casual idea of hedge fund industry as a high risk- high reward game may 
attract more females with risk-seeking tendency. Better insight may be gained by using variables 
other gender to proxy to risk aversion, for example, personal leverage (see Cronqvist et al. (2012), 
Cain et al. (2014)). 
Second, even if the female managers are more risk averse, they may still choose the investment 
with the same riskiness as the men do. Managers may favour strategies resulting in a risk profile 
suitable for their investors’ taste, especially when their funds are catering for a small number of 
investors. In such case, male and female managers may strive for similar volatility if it suits their 
investors, even though their personal risk tolerance levels are different. In effect, their personal risk 
tolerant level is not adequately reflected in their funds’ investment strategies. This effect can be 
controlled for if funds are matched based on their customer base. 
Finally, the net return volatility may not show the lower riskiness that female managers could have 
made with their investment. This could be due to the limit of net return volatility as a measurement 
of risks, or the risk of the strategies that fund managers choose may not materialize in the past yet, 
thus not captured by past return volatility. A potential amendment for this issue is using different 
measurements of risk, for example, the standard deviation of risk adjusted return alpha, or the semi-
variance.  
7.3 Limitations 
As with any study, this thesis faces several limitations. It is important to keep those limitations in 
mind when interpreting the results. Identifying the limitations could also help improve the study in 
the future. 
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The simple propensity score matching method presented in this paper, though useful, is not optimal 
for such research involving time-series as the funds are only matched once at the beginning. With 
complete data on managers’ gender, a multivariate regression model could be more accurate to 
pinpoint the gender effect. The main advantage that PSM method offers is time saving and the 
ability to find meaningful result from incomplete data. 
The lack of data is also a major weakness in this study. Not only data on defunct funds are 
unavailable, data on managers other their gender is also missing, mostly due to the limited time 
available for hand collecting data. Therefore, funds are only matched based on funds’ features, not 
their managers’ characteristics. Potential important variables mentioned previously include working 
experience, education, and personal leverage level. 
The study could benefit from more measurements of performance and risk as well. Though I am 
convinced that Fung-Hsieh risk adjusted return and net return volatility do an adequate job, more 
measurements would certainly add more robustness.  
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, I use propensity score matching method to find out whether there is a performance 
and risk difference between hedge funds with a sole female manager and the ones with a sole male 
manager during the period 1994-2014. The difference is dubbed the average gender effect of the 
manager being female. I find that propensity score matching is able to produce very good match 
between two qualified funds. The measurements for hedge fund performance and risk are the Fung 
Hsieh 8-factor model and the net return volatility. 
There is weak support for the claim that female managers provide more risk-adjusted return 
throughout the period than male managers, however, during the crisis periods of 1997-1998 and 
2007-2009, female have significantly better returns, averaging 0.16 and 0.31 percent monthly, 
respectively. There is no support for a difference in net return volatility between male and female 
manager.  
Four explanations are provided to explain the reason for superior return of female managers. Firstly, 
there could be different characteristics associating with female managers other than the gender-
specific risk aversion that also affects fund performance. Secondly, male managers may make more 
value-destroying trades, especially during the periods of financial turbulence. Thirdly, there is a 
potential glass ceiling in the hedge fund industry that forces female managers to be better than their 
39 
 
 
 
peers to attain a same position. Finally, female managed funds may face additional survivor risks. 
There may be lower capital inflows into female managed hedge funds compared to similar male 
managed ones. Less additional capital may lead to higher probability of non-superior female 
managed funds to cease operation. 
Three explanations are provided on why the volatility of female managed fund and male managed 
fund is not significantly different, even though women are widely regard as more risk averse than 
men. Firstly, female hedge fund managers may be not inherently more risk averse than males. 
Secondly, even if the female managers are more risk averse, they may still choose the investment 
with the same riskiness as the men do. Finally, the net return volatility may not show the lower 
riskiness that female managers could have made. 
Limitations of the study include the use of the sub-optimal PSM, the lack of data and the usage of 
only one measurement for performance (risk adjusted returns) and risk (volatility). However, I 
believe my thesis would provide useful insight into the different between men and women as 
leaders of business organizations and how personal traits of the leaders may affect the whole 
organizations.  
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